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**OFFICE OF PETITIONS** 

In re Application of Zhigang Wang et al. Application No. 10/053,256 Filed: January 18, 2002 Attorney Docket No.: G0186

**DECISION ON PETITION** 

This is a decision on the petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a), filed October 18, 2004, to revive the above-identified application.

The petition is **DISMISSED**.

Any request for reconsideration of this decision must be submitted within TWO (2) MONTHS from the mail date of this decision. Extensions of time under 37 CFR 1.136(a) are permitted. The reconsideration request should include a cover letter entitled "Renewed Petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a)" or "Renewed Petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b)." This is not a final agency decision.

This application became abandoned on January 27, 2004, for failure to pay the issue fee in response to the Notice of Allowance mailed October 24,2003 and which set a three (3) month period for reply. The filing of the petition and the decision on petition precedes the mailing of the Notice of Abandonment.

Petitioner asserts unavoidable delay in responding to the Notice of Allowance because the Notice of Allowance was not received until August 13, 2004.

A grantable petition to revive an abandoned application under 37 CFR 1.137(a) <u>must</u> be accompanied by:

(1) the required reply, unless previously filed. In a nonprovisional application abandoned for failure to prosecute, the required reply may be met by the filing of a continuing application. In a nonprovisional application filed on or after June 8, 1995, and abandoned for failure to prosecute, the required reply may also be met by the filing of a request for continued examination in compliance with § 1.114. In an application or patent, abandoned or lapsed for failure to pay the

issue fee or any portion thereof, the required reply must be the payment of the issue fee or any outstanding balance thereof;

- (2) the petition fee as set forth in § 1.17(I);
- (3) a showing to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to this paragraph was unavoidable; and
- (4) any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in § 1.20(d)) required pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section.

This petition lacks items (3) above.

## SHOWING OF UNAVOIDABLE DELAY

Decisions on reviving abandoned applications on the basis of "unavoidable" delay have adopted the reasonably prudent person standard in determining if the delay was unavoidable:

The word 'unavoidable' . . . is applicable to ordinary human affairs, and requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and observed by prudent and careful men in relation to their most important business. It permits them in the exercise of this care to rely upon the ordinary and trustworthy agencies of mail and telegraph, worthy and reliable employees, and such other means and instrumentalities as are usually employed in such important business. If unexpectedly, or through the unforeseen fault or imperfection of these agencies and instrumentalities, there occurs a failure, it may properly be said to be unavoidable, all other conditions of promptness in its rectification being present.<sup>1</sup>

The showing of record is inadequate to establish unavoidable delay within the meaning of 37 CFR 1.137(a). Specifically, an application is "unavoidably" abandoned only where petitioner, or counsel for petitioner, takes all action necessary for a proper response to the outstanding Office action, but through the intervention of unforeseen circumstances, such as failure or mail, telegraph, telefacsimile, or the negligence of otherwise reliable employees, the response is not timely received in the Office.<sup>2</sup>

ln re Mattullath, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-15 (1912)(quoting Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)); see also Winkler v. Ladd, 221 F. Supp. 550, 552, 138 USPQ 666, 167-68 (D.D.C. 1963), affd, 143 USPQ 172 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Ex parte Henrich, 1913 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 139, 141 (1913). In addition, decisions on revival are made on a "case-by-case basis, taking all the facts and circumstances into account." Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 USPQ 977, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Finally, a petition cannot be granted where a petitioner has failed to meet his or her burden of establishing that the delay was "unavoidable." Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 316-17, 5 USPQ2d 1130, 1131-32 (N.D. Ind. 1987).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31 (Comm'r Pat. 1887).

A review of the file reveals that the Notice of Allowance was mailed to the address of record on October 24, 2003 but that the Notice was returned by the US Postal Service on November 18, 2003 as undelivered. However, while petitioner claims to have received the Notice nearly a year after it was mailed, additional information/evidence is needed to substantiate the unexplained, undocumented and somewhat mystical disappearance of this correspondence for nearly a year. In support of the claim though, perhaps a copy of the envelope with the August 2004 postmark from the USPTO would be helpful.

Additionally, petitioner's failure to respond immediately to the USPTO after receipt in August 2004 of correspondence mailed in October 2003 raises the question as to whether the totality of the circumstances reaches a level of "unavoidable delay".<sup>3</sup>

The showing presented is insufficient to establish unavoidable delay within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 133 and 37 CFR 1.137(a). As petitioner has presented no showing of unavoidable delay, the petition will be dismissed.

## **ALTERNATIVE VENUE**

Petitioner may wish to consider filing a renewed petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b)<sup>4</sup>, which now provides that where the delay in reply was unintentional, a petition may be filed to revive an abandoned application or a lapsed patent pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b).

The filing of a petition under the unintentional standard cannot be intentionally delayed and therefore should be filed promptly. A person seeking revival due to unintentional delay cannot make a statement that the delay was unintentional unless the entire delay,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>See <u>Haines v. Quigq</u>, 673 F. Supp. 314, 317, 5 USPQ2d 1130, 1132 (N.D. Ind. 1987), <u>Vincent v, Mossinghoff</u>, 230 USPQ 621, 624 (D.D.C. 1985); <u>Smith v. Diamond</u>, 209 USPQ 1091 (D.D.C. 1981); <u>Potter v. Dann</u>, 201 USPQ 574 (D.D.C. 1978); <u>Ex parte Murray</u>, 1891 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 130, 131 (1891).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Effective December 1, 1997, the provisions of 37 CFR 1.137(b) now provide that where the delay in reply was unintentional, a petition may be filed to revive an abandoned application or a lapsed patent pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b). A grantable petition filed under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.137(b) <u>must</u> be accompanied by:

<sup>(1)</sup> the required reply, unless previously filed. In a nonprovisional application abandoned for failure to prosecute, the required reply may be met by the filing of a continuing application. In an application or patent, abandoned or lapsed for failure to pay the issue fee or any portion thereof, the required reply must be the payment of the issue fee or any outstanding balance thereof.

<sup>(2)</sup> the petition fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(m);

<sup>(3)</sup> a statement that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) was unintentional. The Commissioner may required additional information where there is a question whether the delay was unintentional; and

<sup>(4)</sup> any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.20(d)) required pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(c)).

including the delay from the date it was discovered that the application was abandoned until the filing of the petition to revive under 37 CFR 1.137(b), was unintentional. A statement that the delay was unintentional is not appropriate if petitioner intentionally delayed the filing of a petition for revival under 37 CFR 1.137(b).

Further correspondence with respect to this matter should be addressed as follows:

By mail:

Mail Stop Petitions

Commissioner for Patents

P.O. Box 1450

Alexandria VA 22313-1450

By FAX:

(703)308-6916

Attn: Office of Petitions

Telephone inquiries concerning this matter may be directed to the undersigned

Petitions Attorney at (571) 272-3212.

Patricia Faison-Ball

**Senior Petitions Attorney** 

Office of Petitions